Truths, Half-Truths and Helpful Lies: A Bayesian Persuasion Model of Influencer Interactions

We examine the seller's optimal strategy in a market with three frequently encountered types of influencers: organic influencers, who care solely about consumer welfare; sponsored influencers, who care about both sales and consumer welfare; and early adopters, who are reputation-conscious micro influencers. Using the Bayesian persuasion framework, we study how the profit-maximizing seller must optimally employ these influencers. From a managerial perspective, we demonstrate that the seller must (a) use the organic influencer with the early adopter when the early adopter has few reputation-related concerns; (b) hire the sponsored influencer with the early adopter when the early adopter is moderately reputation-conscious, and (c) use the early adopter alone when they are highly reputation-conscious. From a research perspective, our analysis offers a platform for research related to influencer marketing by (a) incorporating the role of the early adopter in the product information dissemination; (b) including organic influencers who solely care about consumer welfare; and (c) examining the role of sales commissions and sales guarantees on the optimal information design of the influencers. 韦佳铭是北卡罗来纳大学商学院市场营销方向的博士候选人。她的研究领域包括达人营销、数字营销战略以及平台经济。其博士论文题为《达人营销与平台经济》。她运用博弈论、信息设计、机制设计以及在用理论，研究数字平台和达人如何影响消费者决策与企业战略。