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“商学大讲堂”系列学术讲座（第261讲）---学术名家讲坛（80）
- 来源：
- 学校官网
- 收录时间：
- 2025-01-19 13:29:59
- 时间：
- 2024-12-30 10:00:00
- 地点：
- 商学院116东方厅
- 报告人：
- 王长军
- 学校：
- -/-
- 关键词：
- Duopoly Assortment Competition,MNL Model,Nash Equilibria,Sequential Competition,Simultaneous Competition
- 简介：
- In this study, we investigate two different types of duopolistic competitive assortment problems under the multinomial logit model. We first extend prior work by introducing a more general competitive model incorporating common products under the multinomial logit model. For simultaneous assortment competition, we study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and fully characterize the structures of equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium that always Pareto-dominates others in the settings with both common and exclusive products. This equilibrium is efficiently computed using a carefully crafted iterative best response process. For sequential assortment competition, we find that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads to higher profitability for both the leader and the follower compared to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in simultaneous assortment competition. Despite its profitability advantages, computing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for duopoly sequential assortment competition is NP-hard, even with only exclusive products. To address this hardness result, we propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for problems involving both common and exclusive products.
- -/- 51
报告介绍：
In this study, we investigate two different types of duopolistic competitive assortment problems under the multinomial logit model. We first extend prior work by introducing a more general competitive model incorporating common products under the multinomial logit model. For simultaneous assortment competition, we study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and fully characterize the structures of equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium that always Pareto-dominates others in the settings with both common and exclusive products. This equilibrium is efficiently computed using a carefully crafted iterative best response process. For sequential assortment competition, we find that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads to higher profitability for both the leader and the follower compared to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in simultaneous assortment competition. Despite its profitability advantages, computing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for duopoly sequential assortment competition is NP-hard, even with only exclusive products. To address this hardness result, we propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for problems involving both common and exclusive products.
报告人介绍：
王长军，现任中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院副研究员。主要从事算法博弈与机制设计、组合优化等方向的理论研究。目前已在包括OR、MOR、POM、EC、WINE等的相关领域重要国际期刊及会议发表多篇论文。曾主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、中国科协青年人才托举工程项目及获中国运筹学会青年科技奖等。
